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Abstract 
In a previous published paper, we initiated in this journal discussion about new perspectives 
regarding the organization and functioning of the mind, as a premise for addressing the mind-body 
problem. In this article, we continue focussing discussion on two distinct but interrelated concepts, 
internal-mental existence/ entity and internal-mental reality.  
These two psycho-physiological subunits of the mind interact each other in the form of an 
internal-mental interaction, having no sense if one is isolated/ studied separately from the other. In other 
words, the mind (as a dynamic psycho-physiological construction) has no sense in the absence of this 
internal mental interaction that which takes places between internal-mental existence and internal-mental 
reality.  
In the case of the `mind-body problem`, the tendency until now was to assign extremely complex 
functions of the mind (abstract ideas, consciousness, colors) to simplistic physiological/ neuronal 
structures. We hope that this paper opens a new perspective, in respect to complex/ interrelated neuronal 
structures that construct the mind through their interaction, a process that is both physiologically 
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(transmission of neural impulses) and psychologically (transmission of information), and that requires 
time (an immaterial component) to occurs.  
 
Introduction 
External reality is material (physical/ chemical) in nature, surrounding and interacting with the 
physical/ chemical receptors of the body (electromagnetic waves for visual cells of eyes, acids and bases 
for taste buds/ olfactory receptors, etc.) (1). Such information from the environment impinges on sensory 
receptors which transmit signals to the brain, where it is presented/ encoded in the form of either 
concrete (colors, sounds, tastes and smells, etc.) or conceptually abstract (profit, hierarchy, country/ 
continent, etc.) data (2). In so doing the brain actually generates an internal projection of the external 
reality, thus creating a distinct and veritable internal-mental reality, which is immaterial and becomes 
part of the conscious mind (3).  
It is unknown how the immaterial/ intangible/ abstract domain of the mind is able to intervene, 
such that specific physical characteristics of the stimuli are either attended to, or alternatively essentially 
ignored in preference to abstracting meaning that is not inherently tied to those physical characteristics 
(think, for example, Morse code, or reading facial expressions). Furthermore, the decision making 
process, which may deploy abstract needs over concrete biological needs (eating, sleeping), is not 
understood. And finally, the abstract mind is even capable of integrating and elaborating specific motor 
responses that are abstract in nature, for example, motor participation of the hands, which shape/ place/ 
arrange in a virtual-imaginative space—a process that is currently unclear (4).   
From a classical perspective, the concept of the mind has been approached in two extreme ways: 
monism posits that the mind can be explained in terms of a single reality, which may be either spiritual 
(abstract) or material (brain)—that is, one or the other. In contrast, dualism incorporates both of the 
described (spiritual and material) realities, but makes a rigid distinction between them. In their current 
iterations, neither theory is able to integrate/ interrelate the abstract information related to the mind with 
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the neurobiological support of the brain, a phenomenon known in the literature as ”the mind-body 
problem” (5).  
 
Discussion 
 
1. Computational perspective of the mind 
As a physiological parallel to the “mind-body problem” (the interrelation between abstract data 
and neurobiological support), we draw on the example of another physiological system that might 
provide an analogy for understanding the relationship between the mind and the body. Specifically, the 
circulatory system depends on two distinct factors: the “static” container system (the blood vessels) and 
the “dynamic” content (the circulating blood). Taken together, these two distinct factors generate the 
function of blood circulation/ blood pressure, which has no meaning if one constituent component is 
isolated from the other, that is, if reference is made only to the static container or, alternatively, to the 
dynamic content (6). Extrapolating to the mind-body controversy, the monistic view attempts to reduce 
the dynamic content of information to the static cerebral container (or vice versa), while the dualistic 
view considers the dynamic content of information as existing independently of the static cerebral 
container (5). 
Based on the above example, the mind should incorporate both a material-static (neurological) 
container and a nonmaterial-dynamic (informational) content, which are complementary to each other 
(7, 8). Taken together, these two distinct constituent components compose the mind (a neuro-
informational entity), which has no mental meaning if one component is isolated from the other. Thus, 
our mental existence ceases if the dynamic content becomes static—as when the processing/circulation 
of information is blocked through such procedures as hypnotics or general anaesthesia—or if the 
neurological support system is damaged—as when brain injury occurs (9). Generally, when the mind 
processes any type of abstract information, the psycho-physiological mechanisms involved are the same, 
but the responses differ depending on the type of information processed (10). Thus, the mind is able to 
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access and process distinct information in discrete sessions (cultural, religious, mathematics, 
gastronomy, sexual or related to its own self), somewhat similar to a computer that runs distinct 
applications in distinct sessions (11).  
This computational model of the mind, proposed by Hilary Putnam in 1961 and popular among 
some cognitive theorists yet today, views the human brain like a computer, with the information being 
the programme run by the brain (12). The mind can thus be analysed from a general perspective, in 
terms of hardware and software computational components. At the same time, the mind also needs to be 
analysed from a psycho-physiological perspective (a more human/organic model than a computational 
model), in terms of internal-mental reality and internal-mental existence, as elaborated below (7, 8). Just 
as the mind has no mental meaning should one computational component be isolated from the other, 
then, in a similar way, the mind would have no mental meaning if one psycho-physiological subunit 
(e.g., internal-mental reality) is isolated from the other (e.g., internal-mental existence). 
2. Psycho-physiological perspective of the mind 
According to a psychological perspective, the mind can functionally be divided into two distinct 
subunits, namely an internal-mental existence/ entity (human specific mental existence) and an internal-
mental reality (internal projection of the external reality) (7, 13). In terms of consciousness, this dual 
psychological approach represents the quality-state of ‘somebody’ (existence) being aware of 
‘something’ (reality). The ‘somebody’ refers to the internal-mental existence/ entity. This mental 
existence has abstract (artistic, cultural) preoccupations and pleasures, sometimes acting contrary to 
primary biological needs of the body such as eating or sleeping, in favour of mental goals such as 
enjoying music or internet gaming (14). In decision-making terms, the internal-mental existence 
corresponds to that part of the mind having voluntary and selective attention and dealing with the 
processing of various kinds of selected data; we often practice attention and the processing of data 
through virtual models (games, mathematics, etc.), taking enjoyment in improving our mental 
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performances. The ‘something,’ on the other hand, refers rather to the internal/ mental representation of 
information (colours, sounds, tastes, abstract ideas, etc., which exist only in the mind) (15), which makes 
up an internal mental reality surrounding and interacting with our mental existence (7, 8).  
Just as the physical body exists within an environment where the body interacts with the 
surrounding physical/ chemical stimuli (an external physical interaction), our mental existence/ entity 
exists within an internal mental reality that is composed (represented in terms) of internal mental stimuli. 
This means that, beyond the external-physical interaction (between external stimuli and physical body/ 
receptors), there is within the brain an analogous internal-mental interaction (between our mental 
existence and internal mental stimuli) (7). On the one hand, the internal-mental reality (colors, sounds) 
might be viewed as a cerebral promoter/ stimulus triggering mental activity, such that the internal-
mental reality would impart a sense of a cause in the psychological processes of internal-mental 
interaction (because it initiates mental activation and responses). However, in a physiological approach, 
colors, sounds, etc. also have an apparent sense of an effect, being the internal cerebral consequence/ 
result generated by action of an external cause/ stimulus. To be able to integrate the two perspectives 
into a single and coherent approach, it is necessary to clarify if this internal-mental reality (colors, 
sounds, etc.) would represent a cause (according to psychological perspective) or an effect (according to 
physiological perspective) within a unitary psycho-physiological mechanism. 
The physiological process of receiving external information supposes transmission of this 
information towards the brain. For example, electromagnetic waves act on eyes and information is thus 
transmitted to the brain, stimulating primary visual cortex; air pressure acts on the ears and thus 
information is transmitted to the brain, stimulating primary auditory cortex, and so on. The activation of 
these primary cortical areas is the internal effect/ result of the physiological process of receiving 
environmental stimuli, which is induced by action of an external cause/ stimulus. In non-humans, this 
physiological process of receiving external information probably stops here (being further connected to 
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motor reflex responses), and implies various kinds of encoding information that are inaccessible and 
thus unaware to the mind (e.g., the physical format of visual stimuli in the environment is 
electromagnetic waves, while the physiologic format in the brain is represented by activation of primary 
visual cortex—the brain has no inherent awareness of these electromagnetic waves) (16).     
The human brain goes further and converts information from a physiological format (activation 
of primary visual/ auditory cortical areas, etc.) to a mental format (in the form of colors, sounds, etc.). 
The brain of humans performs the genesis of colors, sounds, etc. implying dedicated physiological 
resources (the secondary cortical areas, neuronal energy/ consumption), but with a well-defined 
psychological purpose, represented by conversion of information into a format (mental) that is 
accessible to the mind (17). Entering into conscious domains of the mind, this mental information 
(colors, sounds, etc.) is able to initiate/ activate mental processes which further trigger mental response/ 
effect. As a consequence, internal-mental reality (colors, sounds, etc.) is interpreted as the sense of a 
cause (internal mental stimuli/ internal-mental reality) for the mind, being supported by a dedicated 
psycho-physiological process that is different from (but interconnected to) the physiological process 
related to reception of external information (7).  
3. Internal mental interaction and external physical interaction 
Internal mental interaction and external physical interaction take place independently of each 
other, being interconnected only partially, through information exchanges. A number of examples can be 
invoked to illustrate this process: a) Even though the mind has distributive attention, we are not able to 
pay attention to all informational inputs at once (derived from multiple external stimuli acting 
simultaneously on our body), particularly when they are numerous (18). b) The impression of contact 
generated by clothing (touching perception) disappears shortly after getting dressed, due to the process 
of habituation (19). c) The internal interaction can be channelled through attentional focus on some 
specific (concrete or abstract) aspects within our mind (the mind can conjure up an image), ignoring 
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informational inputs that resulted from external interaction (making abstraction of what the eyes see, so 
that the mental representation of external visual information is lacking). Or, the mind can ignore some 
objects from the visual field, focussing attention on only one object (20). d) Dream states represent a 
cogent example of the internal interaction between mental existence and mental reality, with no relation 
to the external medium/ interaction (21). e) Finally, autism might be viewed as a pathological condition 
that consists in a deficient transfer (input/ output) of information between internal and external 
interaction (22). Autistic persons live “in their own world” (internal reality), that is partly disconnected 
from “external reality”. On the one hand, this disconnection is perceived as a social impairment (23). On 
the other, autistic persons sometimes exhibit “savant syndrome” (profound and prodigious capacities/ 
abilities, far in excess to that of unaffected individuals) (24), due perhaps to a facilitation of the internal 
mental functioning/ interaction (between internal-mental existence and internal-mental reality) through 
partial exclusion of the external inputs (generated by external interaction/ reality).  
With respect to internal mental interaction, our internal-mental reality corresponds to specific 
(secondary cortical) areas in the brain that transform externally derived information into mental/ 
conscious data (colours, sounds, etc.). At the other end, our mental existence also has its own delineated 
structure (hypothalamus) that a) receives information from internal-mental reality (cortex) through 
attentional focus, b) processes it, and then c) sends it back to the cortex in the form of conclusions/ 
results (7). Thus, the information circulates bi-directionally between internal-mental existence 
(hypothalamus) and internal-mental reality (cortex), being encoded perhaps in the frequency of neural 
impulses. The psycho-physiological difference between this internal-mental interaction (between 
hypothalamus and cortex) and external-physical interaction (between external stimuli and body) lies in 
the fact that the first supposes only one physiological stimulus (neural impulses) and “multiple 
informations” associated with it (encoded in frequency), while external interactions suppose multiple 
external stimuli and only “one information” associated with each stimulus (a stimulus encoding/ 
referring to only one physical matter) (7, 8).  
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4. The ”mind-body problem” 
In order to facilitate an understanding of the mind and of the existing interrelation between 
abstract information and the neurobiological support (the mind-body problem), it is first necessary to 
divide the mind in two distinct psycho-physiological components: internal-mental reality and internal-
mental existence. This psycho-physiological delineation does not necessarily imply that internal-mental 
reality and internal-mental existence should be studied separately. In fact, it would probably be 
counterproductive to ignore the concept of an internal-mental interaction, and to discuss either our 
internal-mental existence (that is different by our physical body), or the internal-mental reality (that is 
different by the surrounding environmental reality) in isolation from one another, due to two important 
reasons. First, the study of interaction/ compatibility between internal-mental existence and internal-
mental reality can highlight some important physiological observations (related to autonomic duality), a 
concept to be developed in a future article. Second, internal-mental reality is part of the conscious mind, 
contributing thus to the construction of an internal-mental existence. Why do we make this latter point? 
Because psychologically, our conscious mind is the mental realm in which our awareness of self and our 
executive control of the mind exists. And because physiologically, the internal-mental existence sends 
information about itself to the internal-mental reality, which then is returned back to internal-mental 
existence, informing it about its/his/her existence/awareness and response (insofar as self-monitoring 
and control, capacity for auto-maintaining, etc.).  
Elaborating on this point with an example, the statement “the brain generates color in secondary 
visual cortex” is overly-simplistic and therefore counterproductive (studying internal reality = colors = 
secondary visual cortex, separately by internal mental existence = hypothalamus), because it discourages 
further critical analysis of an actual underlying process. Specifically, in the secondary visual cortex the 
brain does not synthesize color pigments (something that would be static); in the secondary visual cortex 
color is actually represented by generated nervous impulses (with certain characteristics: frequency, 
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amplitude) which have the significance of a certain color only for another neuronal structure which is 
able to receive them (e.g., hypothalamus). In other words, our internal mental reality (secondary sensory 
cortex) has no meaning in the absence of an internal mental existence, and vice versa. This point has an 
implication which could help shed light on the mind-body problem. If our internal reality and internal 
mental existence/identity (two mental subdomains) depend on each other, then the mind (which 
incorporates these two subdomains) exists and depends on their interaction/ interrelation. Namely the 
mind must depend on the brain (neurobiological support), information (neural impulses), and the flow of 
that information in an ordered manner (providing a temporal dimension and thereby giving mental 
function a concept of time). This last concept may be key to solving the mind-body problem in that the 
mind depends not only on a material support (the brain) but also on an immaterial dimension, namely, 
time. In incorporating an immaterial element, the mind has entered the realm of abstraction, and lays the 
foundation for abstract perception and thinking, a topic that will be discussed in a future paper. 
5. Perspectives 
Finally, we want to raise the idea of the phenomenon of ‘integrality’ (how the whole is made up 
and functions) as an introduction to a forthcoming discussion. A cell has specific cellular functions 
(division, etc.). Many cells aggregate to form different tissues which further generate complex systems/ 
organs. These organs perform functions that have no sense of its separate/individual constituent cells. 
The femoral bone cell intervenes (together with muscles, tendons) in locomotion, the cranial bone cell 
intervenes (together with meninges) in protection of the brain, the dental bone cell intervenes (together 
with tongue) in digestion/ mastication. Yet none of the mentioned complex bone functions (which are 
different) can be attributed to a single bone cell (as a singular/ distinct entity). In other words, the 
complex function has no sense for (or apparent relation to) its simplistic structure, because the respective 
simplistic structure contributes only in part to the performing of the respective function.  
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Returning to the ”mind-body problem” also with an example useful for perspective, we can see 
an object when look at it, and ceases to see it (sees anything else with eyes) when turn the head. In a 
similar way, our mental entity/ existence can focus attention exclusively towards the head/ conversation 
with a person, without any interest in respect to his/ her clothes/ shoes color (even if they are present in 
our visual field). After finishing discussion (the person's departure), we could be unable to describe the 
clothes/ shoes color (if it was not observed passively, beyond of our attention). In other words, internal 
mental reality (the shoes color) has no meaning/ doesn’t exists in the absence of (attentional focus of) 
internal mental entity. And the reverse is also true, which means that our mind doesn’t exist/ has no 
meaning in the absence of internal mental interaction. All our mental processes (internal mental 
existence, internal mental reality, memory, etc.) are dynamic, even if many mental processes are 
unconscious. This is the reason for which we can disappear total mentally if our brain is not oxygenated/ 
vascularized for about 10 minutes- due to the fact that many cerebral dynamic processes are no longer 
supported and disappear.  
 
Conclusions 
From a computational perspective, it is unclear how abstract information (intangible/ immaterial, 
unlimited in respect not only to volume but also to domains) is related to the neurobiological support of 
the brain. Such abstract information intervenes not only in the decision making process but also in 
various specific biological functions and responses of the body, thus becoming an important topic for 
debate and discussion. 
But, from a psycho-physiological perspective, in addition to external-physical interaction there is 
also an analogous internal mental interaction, between internal-mental existence and internal-mental 
reality. The internal-mental entity is different from the physical body, the internal-mental reality is 
different from environmental reality, and the mental interaction is also different from physical 
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interaction. In other words, this model would suggest that there is actually no `mind-body problem`. 
Rather, there are two distinct and interconnected questions, namely the mind (the `data-brain problem`) 
and the body-environment interaction (`body-environment problem`). The body-environment problem is 
physiological in nature, and is relatively well documented. The mind (data-brain problem) is psycho-
physiological in nature, and corresponds to a neuro-informational entity.  
With respect to the `data-brain problem` (neuro-informational nature of the mind), it is well 
documented that concrete conscious data (colors, sounds) are supported by the brain, originating in the 
secondary somatosensory cortex. This means that the mind should incorporate both conscious data 
(colors) and an unconscious physical support (brain), the second being currently underestimated. 
In the case of the `mind-body problem`, the tendency has been to assign extremely complex 
functions of the mind (abstract ideas, consciousness, colors) to simplistic physiological structures 
(neurons, centers, secondary cortex). And we presented that the cerebral support of the mind is actually 
more complex, incorporating interrelated neuronal structures (that should be not studied separately 
because their interaction generates the mind) and an immaterial component (the time, which is required 
for interaction). We are convinced that the things are actually more complex, but, due to limited space 
and a didactical purpose we presented the things as simple as possible.  
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